希拉里·怀特霍尔·帕特南1926—2016

生平

希拉里·普特南出生于芝加哥，1944年入宾夕法尼亚大学跟随丘奇曼（C. West Churchman）和怀特（Morton White）学习科学哲学和美国哲学史，1949年就读于加州大学洛杉矶分校，在赖欣巴哈指导下，获哲学博士学位。曾先后职教于普林斯顿大学和麻省理工学院，后任哈佛大学哲学教授和皮尔逊讲座现代数学与数理逻辑教授。

普特南的研究兴趣非常广泛，内容涉及逻辑、数学、心灵哲学、语言哲学、科学哲学、物理学、历史学、伦理学、宗教、社会政治等众多领域，最初是以理论物理学家和数学家为人所知，曾与戴维斯（Martin Davis）和罗宾森（Julia Robinson）共同解决希尔伯特第十问题，引起当时学界的高度重视，晚年则关注伦理学和宗教问题。普特南的思想善变，最显著的变化表现他在对实在论的态度，50-70年代为科学实在论者，70-80年代为内在的实在论者，90年代之后倾向常识的实在论或实用主义的实在论。

著名思想实验

孪生地球

缸中之脑

Hilary Whitehall Putnam (; July 31, 1926 – March 13, 2016) was an American philosopher, mathematician, computer scientist, and figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. He contributed to the studies of philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. Outside philosophy, Putnam contributed to mathematics and computer science. Together with Martin Davis he developed the Davis–Putnam algorithm for the Boolean satisfiability problem and he helped demonstrate the unsolvability of Hilbert's tenth problem.

Putnam applied equal scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws. As a result, he acquired a reputation for frequently changing his positions. In philosophy of mind, Putnam argued against the type-identity of mental and physical states based on his hypothesis of the multiple realizability of the mental, and for the concept of functionalism, an influential theory regarding the mind–body problem. Putnam also originated the computational theory of mind. In philosophy of language, along with Saul Kripke and others, he developed the causal theory of reference, and formulated an original theory of meaning, introducing the notion of semantic externalism based on a thought experiment called Twin Earth.

In philosophy of mathematics, Putnam and W. V. O. Quine developed the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, an argument for the reality of mathematical entities, later espousing the view that mathematics is not purely logical, but "quasi-empirical". In epistemology, Putnam criticized the "brain in a vat" thought experiment, which appears to provide a powerful argument for epistemological skepticism, by challenging its coherence. In metaphysics, he originally espoused a position called metaphysical realism, but eventually became one of its most outspoken critics, first adopting a view he called "internal realism", which he later abandoned. Despite these changes of view, throughout his career Putnam remained committed to scientific realism, roughly the view that mature scientific theories are approximately true descriptions of ways things are.

In his later work, Putnam became increasingly interested in American pragmatism, Jewish philosophy, and ethics, engaging with a wider array of philosophical traditions. He also displayed an interest in metaphilosophy, seeking to "renew philosophy" from what he identified as narrow and inflated concerns. He was at times a politically controversial figure, especially for his involvement with the Progressive Labor Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s.